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1. Introduction 
Studying the linkages between financial development and growth is a popular topic both in 
theoretical and empirical macroeconomics. According to Levine (2005), financial systems 
foster growth as they produce ex ante information about possible investment; monitor 
investment and exert corporate governance after providing finance; facilitate the trading, 
diversification, and management of risk; mobilize and pool savings; and ease the exchange of 
goods and services. As early as 1969, Goldsmith (1969) provided the first cross-country 
empirical study documenting the existence of a strong positive link between the functioning 
of the financial system and growth. A number of studies followed, generally confirming the 
existence of this link (see Levine, 2005, for a survey). The majority of these studies are based 
on cross-country macro data, but cross-country industry-level and firm-level data have also 
been used. For instance, Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that in countries with better 
functioning financial systems, industries that are naturally heavy users of external finance 
grow faster than industries that are not, and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) show 
that in these same countries, a larger proportion of firms grows at rates that cannot be self-
financed, but require access to external financing. 
 Yet, cross-country economic growth regressions are likely to suffer from data 
compatibility problems, as country officials may define, collect, and measure variables 
inconsistently across countries (Levine and Zarvos, 1996). Using cross-regional data within a 
single country instead of cross-country data makes these problems less severe, and represents 
a promising alternative route for examining the impact of finance on growth1. Our paper 
follows this route: we analyze the links between finance and growth in 30 Chinese provinces, 
over the period 1989-2003.  
China represents an interesting case study for two reasons. First, considering that 
Bekaert et al. (2006) find that China’s extraordinary growth cannot be fully explained using 
standard growth regressions, understanding its determinants remains an open question. 
Second, Allen et al. (2005) characterize China as a counterexample to the findings of the 
finance-growth literature, as in spite of a malfunctioning financial system, it has one of the 
                                                 
1 Very few studies have followed this route. For instance, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Dehejia and Lleras-
Muney (2003) study the impact of finance on economic growth by examining individual states in the USA. 
Similarly, Guiso et al. (2002) analyze the effects of financial development on growth across individual regions in 
Italy. 
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fastest growing economies2. The Chinese case suggests therefore that there might be 
circumstances under which financial distortions do not represent an impediment to growth.  
Existing research on the links between finance and growth in China has led to 
contrasting results: some authors documented a positive relationship; others, a negative one; 
and others, no relationship at all. Our analysis extends the literature in several dimensions. 
First, we use a wide range of financial indicators, including traditionally used indicators of 
financial intermediary development (ratio of bank loans, total loans, or total household saving 
deposits in the banking system over GDP); China-specific indicators measuring the level of 
state interventionism in finance (credit provided by the four main state-owned commercial 
banks over total credit or GDP; ratio of loans to deposits of the state-owned banks); and 
indicators measuring the degree of market driven financing in the economy (share of fixed 
assets investment financed by domestic loans relative to that financed by state budget 
appropriation; share of investment financed by self-raised funds). Our wide selection of 
indicators allows us to account both for the size and quality effect of financial intermediation. 
Second, for the first time in the Chinese context, we analyze the links between finance and 
two sources of GDP growth, namely physical capital accumulation and total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth. Third, we investigate whether, as a result of the progressive 
restructuring of the banking sector in China, the link between finance and growth has changed 
after 2000. Finally, considering that China is among the top Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
recipients in the world (Prasad and Wei, 2005), we investigate whether the finance-growth 
nexus changes for regions with different FDI to GDP ratios. This exercise is motivated by 
Harrison et al. (2004), who show that firms in countries with greater FDI inflows are less 
likely to face financial constraints, as incoming foreign investment provides an additional 
source of capital. It is therefore possible that, in the Chinese case, FDI provides capital to 
firms which would otherwise be constrained in their growth by the inability to obtain funds, 
due to distortions in the banking sector3.  
We find that traditionally used indicators of financial development and China-specific 
indicators measuring the level of state interventionism in finance are generally negatively 
associated with growth and its sources, while indicators measuring the degree of market 
                                                 
2 According to our data, China’s annual growth rate of real GDP has been on average 9.1 percent over the period 
1989-2003. 
3 In line with this idea, Huang (2003) formulates a “demand perspective” on FDI, which stresses that private 
Chinese enterprises may be forced to look for foreign investors as they are constrained in their activity due to 
discrimination relative to state-owned enterprises both from the banking system and the equity market. Private 
firms might therefore use foreign joint-ventures as a way to acquire needed capital in order to undertake 
investment. Moreover, as highlighted in Luo (2007), forming joint-ventures with foreign firms may also reduce 
the level of asymmetric information faced by private firms, leading to easier access to bank finance. 
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driven financing in the economy tend to promote GDP and TFP growth, as well as capital 
accumulation. These effects have gradually declined over time and tend to be weaker for high 
FDI recipients, suggesting that FDI may be used to alleviate the costs associated with the 
inefficient banking sector. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe 
the Chinese financial system and review the literature on the finance-growth nexus in China. 
Section 3 describes our data set and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4 illustrates 
our baseline specification and estimation methodology. Section 5 presents our main empirical 
results. Section 6 investigates how the relationship between growth and our financial 
indicators has evolved over time, and how it depends on the level of FDI received by each 
province. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Financial system and finance-growth nexus in China 
 
2.1 China’s financial system 
Before 1978, the Chinese economy was centrally planned and production was exclusively 
conducted by state-owned enterprises. The financial system consisted of a single bank, the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC), which served both as a Central Bank and as a commercial 
bank. Yet, the role of the PBC was very limited as most long-term investment financing was 
not channelled to enterprises through the banking system, but financed with budgetary grants. 
The PBC only provided working capital to enterprises.  
In 1978, the single bank was split. The PBC was left to operate as a Central Bank; and 
three state-owned banks were created: the Bank of China, the People’s Construction Bank of 
China, and the Agriculture Bank of China, respectively dealing with foreign currency 
transactions, investment in manufacturing, and banking in rural areas. A fourth state-owned 
bank was created in 1984, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. It took over all 
commercial transactions from the PBC. After 1984, a number of non-state owned banks also 
entered the financial system, including commercial banks, urban and rural credit cooperatives, 
trust and investment companies, financial companies, and other institutions. Yet, in 1994, the 
state-owned banks still dominated the financial sector: their total assets covered around 78 
percent of the total assets of the entire financial sector. Moreover, the banking system was 
plagued by huge amounts of non performing loans (Podpiera, 2006). 
 Major banking reforms were initiated in 1994 when the central government decided to 
separate policy banks from commercial banks, and established three policy-lending banks and 
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four specialized commercial banks. The banking reforms thereafter include, among others: 
transforming the urban credit cooperatives into commercial banks (1996-1998); granting 
limited licenses to some foreign banks; reducing government intervention in credit allocation; 
loosening interest rate controls; recommending standard accounting and prudential norms 
(Shirai, 2002). A further impulse for changes in the banking sector came about with China’s 
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Progresses include fewer restrictions 
on ownership and increased operational freedom. As a consequence of the reforms, by the end 
of 2002, the state-owned banks’ market share had declined to 68 percent, and non performing 
loans had also significantly declined (Podpiera, 2006; Allen et al., 2006). 
Despite the large size of the banking sector in China, until recently, most bank credit 
was directed to inefficient state enterprises, leaving good private enterprises without access to 
external funding. Until 1998, the four state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs, i.e. the Bank of 
China, China Construction Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the 
Agricultural Bank of China) were instructed to lend to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 
Chinese state enterprises submitted investment plans and funding requests that had to be 
approved at the provincial and central authority level. Based on this, lending quotas were 
issued to enterprises. Since private enterprises were excluded from submitting investment 
plans, they were, naturally, also excluded from lending quotas. In addition, there was also a 
legal bias against private domestic firms, which made it harder for them to collateralize their 
assets in order to obtain loans, and made it riskier for banks to lend them money (Huang, 
2003). 
The system was liberalized at the end of 1990s, when the China Constitution 
acknowledged the private sector to be an integral part of the economy, and theoretically it is 
not in place any more. However, in practice, banks still consider private enterprises to be 
riskier than their public peers either due to their short credit history or lower chance of being 
bailed out by the government. Moreover, as discussed in Park and Sehrt (2001), lending by 
state banks is still determined by policy reasons, rather than by commercial motives. 
 In summary, a major problem in China’s corporate sector is a political pecking order 
of firms which leads to the allocation of China’s financial resources to the least efficient firms 
(state-owned enterprises), while denying the same resources to China’s most efficient firms 
(private enterprises). Although they are the engine of growth in the Chinese economy4, 
                                                 
4 Allen et al. (2005) document that the private sector in China dominates the state and listed sectors, both in 
terms of output size and growth trend. Specifically, they show that between 1996 and 2002, the private sector 
grew at an annual rate of 14.3 percent, while the combined state and listed sector only grew at 5.4 percent. 
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private firms are discriminated against in terms of access to external funding, property rights 
protection, taxation, and market opportunities. Such distortions may force private Chinese 
firms to look for foreign investors (Huang, 2003; Luo, 2007). By establishing cross-border 
relationships with foreign firms, private domestic firms can bypass both the financial and 
legal obstacles that they face at home. FDI can in fact be seen as a form of equity financing 
(Harrison et al., 2004). Moreover, from the very beginning of economic reforms in China, 
foreign-invested firms were accorded a superior legal status compared with private firms.  
 
2.2 The finance-growth nexus in China 
A first strand of literature has used provincial level data to look at the links between indicators 
of financial development and growth in China obtaining contrasting results. Like ours, most 
of these studies are panel studies. For instance, Liu and Li (2001) analyze the links between 
growth and the four sources of total investment in fixed assets (state budget appropriation, 
national bank loans, self-raised funds, and foreign investment). They find that between 1985 
and 1998, the growth of national bank loans and self-raised funds are both positively related 
to the growth of provincial output, while state budget appropriation only affects growth in the 
interior regions, where non state sources of finance might be unavailable. Aziz and Duenwald 
(2002) use data for 27 provinces over the period 1988-97 and find no evidence that financial 
development (proxied by bank lending) boosts growth among Chinese provinces. 
Specifically, domestic private credit plays a small role in the financing of the fast growing 
provinces. Using similar data over the period 1990-1999, Boyreau-Debray (2003) finds that 
credit extended by the banking sector has a negative impact on growth, which she attributes to 
the burden of supporting the state-owned corporate sector. Chen (2006) shows that Chinese 
growth has been fostered by the substitution of loans for state budget appropriation, but not by 
loan expansion. His findings are challenged by Cheng and Degryse (2006) who argue that 
banking development spurs growth in China5. These studies make use of different financial 
indicators, and different econometric techniques, which might explain their contrasting 
results. 
 A second strand of literature has focused on firm-level data to try and explain the high 
growth rates experienced in China, in spite of a poorly developed financial system. Ayyagari 
et al. (2007) rely on the World Bank Investment Climate Survey data that covers 2400 
Chinese firms across 18 different cities. The survey was collected in 2003 and includes 
                                                 
5 Using a multivariate Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach, based on annual Chinese data over the period 
1952-2001, Liang and Teng (2006) find that high levels of bank credit in China do not cause higher growth. 
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information on sources of financing in 2003 and firm level information that are recalled for 3 
years, namely 2000, 2001 and 2002. They analyze firm financing patterns, and show that a 
relatively small percentage of firms in their sample use formal bank finance, while reliance on 
informal finance is much stronger. They then show that it is finance from the formal financial 
system that is associated with faster firm-level growth, while informal finance is not. They 
conclude that it is not the non-standard financing mechanisms that promote growth in China. 
Cull et al. (2007) use data drawn from the annual accounting reports filed by industrial firms 
with the National Bureau of Statistics over the period 1998-2003 to investigate whether trade 
credit could have been what financed China’s spectacular growth in spite of its 
malfunctioning financial system. They conclude that trade credit did not play a significant 
role6.  
While we acknowledge that useful information can be extracted at the micro-level, we 
believe that the finance-growth link can and should be apprehended at the macro-level as 
well. We consider our approach as a useful complement to the recent firm-level analyses that 
looked at the role of finance on firm performance in China. While the advantage of using 
firm-level data to describe the financing patterns of firms in recent years is clear-cut, it is of 
less use for the investigation of the evolution of the finance-growth nexus over time (spanning 
the pre and post liberalization period). Our dataset has the advantage of not only covering a 
15 year-period from 1989 to 2003, but of also covering the entire Chinese territory (without a 
limitation to the urban sector only). Our paper contributes therefore to the first strand of the 
literature which analyzed the finance-growth nexus in China. Its specific contributions are 
that it looks, for the first time in the Chinese context, at the links between finance, GDP 
growth, and two of its sources: physical capital accumulation and TFP growth. Moreover, it 
makes use of a very wide range of financial indicators measuring both financial development 
and distortions, and focusing for the first time, on whether the effects of these indicators on 
growth have declined over time, and on whether they differ across provinces characterized by 
different levels of FDI. Our objective is to understand whether there might be circumstances 
under which financial distortions do not hinder growth. 
                                                 
6 Héricourt and Poncet (2007) and Dollar and Wei (2007) also use firm-level data in the Chinese context, to link, 
to some extent, the financial dimension of the economy and the real dimension. Using World Bank Investment 
Climate Survey data, and focusing on firms’ investment behavior, Héricourt and Poncet (2007) show that public 
firms do not appear to be credit constrained, and are not affected by foreign presence. On the other hand, private 
firms appear to suffer more from financial constraints, which are however alleviated in the presence of abundant 
foreign investment. Dollar and Wei (2007) use data from a survey conducted in 2005 and covering the period 
2002-2004, to study firms’ returns to capital. Their survey covers 12400 firms in 120 cities, located in all 
Chinese provinces (except Tibet). Their results suggest that state-owned firms have significantly lower returns 
than private and foreign-owned firms. 
 8
 
3. Data description and summary statistics 
The key data used in this paper are our indicators of financial intermediary development and 
distortions, as well as measures of real per capita GDP growth and its components, i.e. per 
capita capital stock accumulation and per capita productivity growth. Our sample consists of a 
panel of 30 provinces in Mainland China with annual data for the period 1989-20037. All our 
variables are measured at the province level. Appendix 1 provides details on all variables used 
in our analysis and information on data sources. 
 
3.1 Indicators of financial development and distortions 
Our intention is to evaluate the impact of measures of both financial intermediaries’ 
development and financial distortions on growth and its sources in the context of China. 
Despite its large size, the Chinese banking sector is still dominated by four large state banks 
that allocate most of their financial resources to the inefficient and loss-making state-owned 
enterprise sector (Boyreau-Debray, 2003). As such, the transition to a modern and profit-
oriented banking sector is far from being achieved. 
A major challenge in this paper is therefore to disentangle between the effect of 
financial deepening and that of the distorting nature of the state-ruled banking sector. We go 
further than the indicators of financial development traditionally used in the literature, and 
rely on three families of indicators, intended to proxy for the development of the financial 
sector (Family 1), the misallocation of financial resources (Family 2), and the more modern 
and profit-oriented financial transactions (Family 3). The use of different measures focusing 
on different aspects of financial intermediation will allow us to account for both a size and a 
quality effect of the latter. To assess the robustness of our results, we will use several 
indicators within each family. 
To evaluate the impact of the development of the financial sector, we will use three 
measures of financial depth (Family 1), one based on banks alone, and the other two on both 
bank and non-bank sources of financing. More specifically, we will use the following three 
indicators: 
                                                 
7 China is administratively decomposed into 31 provincial units, which fall into three categories: 22 provinces or 
sheng; 4 autonomous regions or zizhiqu (Nei Monggol, Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia and Guangxi); and 4 municipal 
cities or zhixiashi, under direct supervision of the central power (Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, and, since 1997, 
Chongqing). Tibet is excluded from our sample due to data constraints. 
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(1) The ratio of total bank loans to GDP, which measures banking sector size (BANK 
CREDIT)8.  
(2) The ratio of total (bank and non-bank) loans to GDP, which measures the overall 
depth of the financial sector (TOTAL CREDIT). 
(3) The ratio of household savings deposited in financial intermediaries relative to GDP 
(SAVINGS), which serves as a proxy of China’s financial intermediary development9. 
To evaluate the specific impact of misallocation of funds in the finance-growth nexus in 
China, we rely on the following three measures of the role of distortions induced by state 
interventionism in the financial sector (Family 2): 
(4) The share of state-owned commercial banks in total bank credit (SOCB CREDIT 
share). Chinese statistics do not provide any information on credit allocation between 
state and non-state enterprises. However, given that the state banks’ primary function 
is to channel savings to SOEs, the ratio of the SOCBs credit to total bank credit can be 
interpreted as a proxy for the credit channelled to the state-owned sector. For instance, 
conservative estimates suggest that in the late 1990s, 80 percent of the total amount of 
credit by the SOCBs was extended to the SOEs (Boyreau-Debray, 2003). Even with 
the recent emphasis on profit maximization and management responsibility, state 
banks may still favor the SOEs, with which they have a long customer history and 
which are more likely to be bailed out by the government than non-state enterprises in 
case of financial distress. In contrast, projects in the non-state sector are perceived as 
more risky because of higher information costs and moral hazard.  
(5) The ratio of state-owned commercial banks’ credit to GDP (SOCB CREDIT to GDP).  
(6) The ratio of loans to deposits of the SOCBs (CENTRAL). This ratio captures another 
distortion of the Chinese banking sector, namely the interventionism of the Central 
Bank. It was previously used by Lardy (1998), Dayal-Gulati and Hussain (2002), and 
Boyreau-Debray (2003). In China, while the volume of deposits is determined by 
economic activity, the volume of lending is largely determined by policy objectives 
                                                 
8 Unlike past studies and following Beck et al. (2000), we carefully deflate those financial intermediary statistics, 
which are expressed as a ratio to GDP. Specifically, financial stock items are measured at the end of the period, 
while GDP is measured over the period. Simply dividing financial stock items by GDP can therefore produce 
misleading measures of financial development. This paper deflates end-of-year financial balance sheet items by 
end-of-year consumer price indices (CPI), and deflates the GDP series by the annual CPI. We then compute the 
average of the real financial balance sheet item in year t and t-1, and divide this average by real GDP measured 
in year t. 
9 This indicator excludes corporate deposits, which might be affected by the central government’s credit policies. 
As argued by Chen (2006), households’ deposits are based on households’ own decisions, and are much less 
influenced by the central government’s policies than loans. 
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and is set through a credit plan, independently of the ability of branch banks in each 
region to finance the lending target from local deposits (Lardy, 1998). As pointed out 
by Boyreau-Debray (2003), some rapidly growing provinces could therefore have a 
low credit quota and be constrained in their lending relative to the rapid growth of 
their deposits. Alternatively, branch banks in slower growing regions could be 
assigned high quotas with insufficient local deposits to finance their lending: these 
provinces would therefore depend on the Central Bank to lend them additional funds. 
We follow the literature and consider the ratio of SOCB loans to deposits as a measure 
of the Central Bank’s credit to local branch banks aimed at helping them to meet their 
lending quotas.  
Our third family of indicators intends to proxy for the efficient use of capital in a context 
of widespread misallocation. We rely on information of the decomposition of fixed asset 
investment financing by source. This is typically broken into domestic loans, state budgetary 
appropriation, foreign investment, and self-raised funds10. In general, loans are considered a 
more efficient means of resource distribution than state budget allocation. Unlike state budget 
appropriation, loans call in fact for payments of interest and principals, helping to harden 
enterprises’ budget constraints, and promoting more efficient use of capital. Self-raised funds 
may represent even harder budget constraints in a context of ineffectual decision-making and 
excessive investment. Both Liu and Li (2001) and Chen (2006) make use of these measures of 
fixed assets investment financing. The former find a positive and significant relationship 
between growth and fixed asset investments financed by domestic loans and self-raised funds, 
and the latter conclude that, while loan expansion did not directly contribute to growth, the 
substitution of loans for state budget appropriation significantly fostered it. 
We construct the following two measures of market and profit-oriented financial 
transactions (Family 3): 
(7) The share of fixed asset investment financed by domestic loans relative to that 
financed by state budgetary appropriation (LOANS over APPRO). 
(8) The share of fixed asset investment financed by self-raised funds (SELF RAISED 
FUNDS). 
                                                 
10 Domestic loans include funds borrowed from domestic banks and non-bank financial institutions by local 
enterprises and institutions. State budgetary appropriation consists essentially of appropriation in the government 
budget earmarked for capital construction and infrastructure projects. Foreign investment refers to foreign funds 
in fixed assets, foreign funds borrowed and managed by the government or by individual units, as well as foreign 
funds in joint-ventures. Self-raised funds include funds raised by various types of enterprises through non-state 
channels such as bonds, stocks, venture capital, and retained earnings. 
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All our financial indicators are measured at the provincial level. This can be justified 
considering that although banks can technically finance across provincial lines, the majority 
of their activities takes place within provinces. The World Bank’s (2005) report on markets 
integration in China indicates a positive and significant correlation between provincial bank 
deposits and loans (p. 136). In the light of the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) test, this finding 
suggests a very limited intra-national mobility of bank financing. This result holds even after 
controlling for national factors and province-specific shocks. Moreover, an increased 
correlation is observed in the 1990s, suggesting a decrease in capital mobility within the 
banking sector in most recent years11. 
 
3.2 Indicators of economic growth and its sources 
Our investigation of the finance-growth nexus in China will assess the impact of our various 
indicators of financial development on real per capita GDP growth, capital accumulation, and 
productivity growth. 
The rate of real per capita GDP growth (GDP GROWTH) is computed as yearly 
growth of per capita GDP deflated by consumer prices. The growth rate of the per capita 
physical capital stock (CAPITAL GROWTH) is computed using the perpetual inventory 
method. We follow Harberger’s (1978) suggestion for deriving an initial estimate of the 
capital stock, which assumes that each province was at its steady-state capital-output ratio in 
197412. We then apply the perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate (δ) of five 
percent to compute capital stocks in later years. The capital stock (Kt) is therefore computed 
using the following formula: Kt+1 = Kt + It – δ Kt, where It represents real investment in fixed 
assets. 
As in Beck et al. (2000), our measure of productivity growth (TFP GROWTH) builds 
on the neoclassical production function. We assume that this aggregate production function is 
common across provinces and time, so that aggregate output in province i, Yi, is given by the 
                                                 
11 As highlighted by World Bank (2005), in 2000, only 5 percent of financial flows were conducted through the 
bond and stock markets. While recent shifts in financial portfolios suggest a tendency of the Chinese capital 
market to evolve towards a more market-based system in which direct financing through stocks and bonds plays 
an incrementally more important role, this development is still at its infancy. For this reason, we have not 
included stock-market related indicators among our financial indicators. 
12 As argued by Beck et al. (2000), while this assumption is surely incorrect, it is better than assuming an initial 
capital stock of zero, which many researchers use. The initial stock is computed for the year 1974, the first year 
for which data on investment flows are available. Alternative measures of capital growth based on assuming an 
initial stock of zero produced similar results. Also note that capital stock figures are computed based on the 
accumulation (perpetual inventory method) of total investment in fixed assets deflated by the GDP deflator. 
Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, no statistics exist at the provincial level over our period of 
investigation on capital-type specific deflators. 
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following expression: 1i i i iY A K L
α α−= , where K denotes the capital stock; L, labor; and A, 
the level of total factor productivity. We solve for the growth rate of per capita productivity 
by first dividing all terms in the production function by L to get per capita production. We 
then take logarithms and the time derivative. Finally, we use the decomposition of province 
level gross domestic product into compensation of workers, depreciation of fixed assets, net 
taxes on production, and operating surplus, in order to compute labor shares for each Chinese 
province. We rely on data for 1997 (which is the first year this information is provided by the 
National Bureau of Statistics in the China Statistical Yearbook) to compute these province-
specific labor shares. We then derive province-level capital shares, αi, as 1-(labor 
compensation/GDP)i, and use them to calculate per capita TFP growth as follows13: 
 
TFP GROWTHi,t = GDP GROWTHi,t – αi * CAPITAL GROWTHi,t     (1) 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
The summary statistics of our variables are presented in Table 1a. Column (1) refers to the 
entire sample; columns (2) and (3) to the early (1989-1999) and late (2000-2003) periods, 
respectively; and columns (4) and (5), respectively to those province-year observations 
belonging to the three lower quartiles, and the highest quartile of the distribution of the FDI 
stock to GDP ratio. 
Comparing the early with the late period, we can observe no major differences in the 
growth rates of GDP, TFP, and capital stock. Yet, the later period is characterized by a much 
higher GDP per capita, with no major differences in the FDI inflows to GDP ratio. It is also 
interesting to note that the share of population with more than primary education increased 
from about 73 percent in the early years to 86 percent in the later years, that the inflation rate 
declined from 9.28 percent to 0.52 percent, and that the share of state entities in total fixed 
assets declined from 65 percent to 52 percent.  
Coming to our financial indicators, the statistics suggest that financial depth, which 
was already high at the start of the period, further increased from 1989 to 2003: the ratio of 
total bank loans to GDP rose from 78 percent to 91 percent, while the ratio of total loans to 
GDP rose from 95 percent to 109 percent. State interventionism, on the other hand, declined, 
probably as a result of the financial reforms discussed in the previous Section. In particular, 
                                                 
13 The capital share varies from 0.65 in the case of Shanghai to 0.30 in the case of Guangxi, and is on average 
equal to 0.35. We thank an anonymous Referee for suggesting the calculation of province-specific capital shares. 
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the share of SOCB credit in total bank credit declined from 68 percent to 59 percent, while the 
ratio of loans to deposits of the SOCBs declined from 112 percent to 77 percent. Surprisingly, 
the share of fixed assets investment financed by loans relative to that financed by state budget 
appropriation also declined over time, as did the share financed by self-raised funds. 
Comparing the low and high-FDI province-year observations, we can see that the 
latter are characterized by higher GDP, TFP, and capital stock growth, by a higher level of 
GDP, degree of openness, percentage of educated people, and a lower share of state entities in 
total investment. The high-FDI regions also display a higher degree of financial depth, and a 
lower degree of state interventionism than their low-FDI counterparts. Finally, the share of 
fixed assets investment financed by loans relative to that financed by state budget 
appropriation is higher for high FDI recipients, while the share financed by self-raised funds 
is slightly lower. 
Table 1b presents the correlation matrix between our growth variables and our 
financial indicators. We can see that our Family 1 and Family 2 indicators are negatively 
related with GDP and TFP growth, as well as with physical capital accumulation, while the 
correlation between our Family 3 indicators, growth, and its sources is generally positive. In 
the Section that follows, we will provide formal evidence for the effects of our financial 
indicators on GDP and TFP growth, and capital accumulation. We will also investigate 
whether the relationship between our financial indicators, growth, and its sources has changed 
over time, and whether it differs across provinces with different FDI stock to GDP ratios. 
 
4. Econometric methodology and baseline specification 
In this Section, we first present our baseline growth equation, and discuss the conditioning 
information set that we use. We then describe our econometric methodology. 
 
4.1 Baseline specification 
We use a cross-province time-series panel of data to estimate the relationship between finance 
and GDP growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth14. Our baseline regression 
takes the following form: 
 
εληγβα tititititi CONTROLFINANCEY ,,,, +++++=∆      (2) 
                                                 
14 We rely on annual growth rate to maximize the number of observations. Our results were robust to using two 
year averages. The results based on the two year averages are not reported for brevity, but are available on 
request. 
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where i indexes our 30 provinces, and t, time. ∆Y is either GDP GROWTH, CAPITAL 
GROWTH, or TFP GROWTH. FINANCE represents in turn each of the eight indicators 
presented in Section 3.1 to proxy respectively for the size of the financial sector, its state-
induced distorting nature, and its market driven functioning. CONTROL is defined according 
to the augmented Solow model as proposed by Mankiw et al. (1992). The logarithm of lagged 
real per capita GDP is included to control for convergence. We also introduce the share of 
population with more than primary schooling as a proxy for human capital (EDUCATION). 
The following five additional policy variables that have been identified in the empirical 
growth literature as being correlated with growth performance across countries (Barro, 1991; 
Easterly et al., 1997) are also included: government expenditure over GDP as an indicator of 
government size (GOV); the rate of inflation based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI); trade 
as a share of GDP (OPENNESS), and FDI inflows as share of GDP (FDI), to capture the 
degree of openness of the economy; and the share of state entities in total investment (STATE 
ENTITIES) as an indicator of low progress in reform. Finally, provincial fixed effects and 
time fixed effects are denoted by ηi and λt respectively, and εi,t is an idiosyncratic error term. 
 
4.2. Econometric methodology 
Let us focus on GDP growth as our dependent variable, and denote with y, the logarithm of 
real per capita GDP; and with X, our set of explanatory variables (including our financial 
indicators and other control variables expressed in logarithms, but excluding lagged per capita 
GDP). Our real per capita GDP growth Equation can be expressed as follows: 
 
yi,t-yi,t-1 = (α-1)yi,t-1 + β’Xi,t + vi + vt + ei,t ,       (3) 
 
The error term in Equation (3) is made up of the following components: vi, which denotes a 
province-specific component (encompassing any permanent additive measurement error); vt, 
which represents a time-specific component (that we account for by including time dummies 
in all our specifications); and ei,t, which is an idiosyncratic component. Equation (3) can be 
rewritten as follows: 
 
yi,t = αyi,t-1 + β’Xi,t + vi +  vt + ei,t,        (4) 
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Equation (4) can be estimated using a within-groups estimator, which controls for 
province-specific heterogeneity. Yet, since the lagged dependent variable is introduced among 
the regressors, together with the provincial fixed effects, this estimator is biased and 
inconsistent even if ei,t is not serially correlated, as the lagged dependent variable is correlated 
with the error term15. Moreover, in all specifications, most of the explanatory variables can be 
expected to be endogenously determined (and many of them are likely to be measured with 
error). We thus need to control for the endogeneity arising both from the dynamic 
specification of the equation and from reverse causation.  
External instruments such as legal origin, which have been commonly used in the 
literature (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998) cannot be used in our context since Chinese provinces 
share a common legal system and similar institutions. Alternatively, we rely on internal 
instruments, using the Generalized-Method-of-Moments (GMM) panel estimator, proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which relies on first-
differencing the estimating equation to get rid of the province-specific fixed effect, and uses 
appropriate lags of the right-hand side variables as instruments.  
As can be seen from the following Equation, first-differencing (4) allows us to 
eliminate the province-specific effect, vi: 
 
yi,t- yi, t-1 = α(yi,t-1 – yi, t-2) + β’(Xi,t- Xi, t-1) + (vt- vt-1) + (ei,t- ei, t-1)     (5) 
 
Yet, in order to estimate Equation (5), instrumentation is still necessary to deal with the 
possible endogeneity of the regressors, and with the correlation between (yi,t-1 – yi, t-2) and (ei,t- 
ei, t-1). Assuming that ei,t is not serially correlated and that the regressors contained in X are 
weakly exogenous (meaning that they are uncorrelated with future realizations of the error 
term), the GMM first-difference estimator uses the following moment conditions: 
 
E[yi,t-s (ei,t- ei, t-1)]=0 for s≥2; t=3,…,15       (6) 
E[Xi,t-s (ei,t- ei, t-1)]=0 for s≥2; t=3,…, 15       (7) 
 
                                                 
15 This bias is generally referred to as the Nickell (1981) bias. Nickell (1981) derives a formula for this bias 
(when there are no exogenous regressors), showing that it approaches 0 as the sample size tends to infinity. The 
within-groups estimator is thus likely to perform well only when the time dimension of the panel is large. 
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These moment conditions imply that values of real per capita GDP (y) and of all the X’s 
lagged twice or more can be used as instruments in our regressions16.  
 The GMM first-difference estimator, suffers however from a significant shortcoming. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) have shown that when the explanatory variables are persistent over 
time, lagged levels of these variables are weak instruments for the regression equation 
expressed in first-differences17. This is likely to lead to biased coefficients, and the problem is 
generally exacerbated in small samples. To avoid this bias, Blundell and Bond (1998) 
proposed a system-GMM estimator. This estimator basically combines in a system the first-
differenced Equation (5) with the same Equation expressed in levels. The instruments for the 
regression in differences are the same as those described above, while the instruments for the 
Equation in levels are lagged differences of the corresponding variables18. The additional 
moment conditions in the system-GMM estimator are: 
 
E[(yi,t-s-yi,t-s-1) (vi + ei,t)] = 0 for s=1; t=3,…,15      (8) 
E[(Xi,t-s-Xi,t-s-1) (vi + ei,t)] = 0 for s=1; t=3,…,15      (9) 
 
As discussed in Bond et al. (2001), Berg and Krueger (2004), and Hauk and Wacziarg (2004), 
the system-GMM is indeed the most suitable way to address the problems of estimating 
growth regressions. For this reason, we use this particular estimator in the estimation of all 
Equations in our paper.19 
Consistency of the GMM estimates depends on the validity of the instruments. We test 
for the validity of our instruments by using two tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991): 
the J test and the test for second-order serial correlation of the residuals (m2). The former is 
the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the number of parameters, under 
                                                 
16 The first-difference GMM estimator was originally developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and was first 
introduced in the growth literature by Caselli et al. (1996). 
17 Blundell and Bond (1998) also show that the instruments used with the standard first-differenced GMM 
estimator (i.e. the endogenous variables lagged two or more periods) become less informative in models where 
the variance of the fixed effects is particularly high relative to the variance of the transitory shocks.  
18 The latter are valid instruments under the assumption that there is no correlation between the differences of 
these variables and the province-specific effect. Note that considering that lagged levels of the regressors are 
used as instruments for the differenced equation, it is sufficient to use only the most recent difference as an 
instrument in the equation in levels.  
19 All our results were robust to using the simple first-difference GMM estimator rather than the system-GMM. 
Also note that while estimates obtained using the first-difference GMM estimator only reflect the within-
provinces dimension of the relationship between financial indicators and growth, as the between-provinces 
dimension is differenced away, the system-GMM estimator also allows us to consider the latter dimension. 
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the null of instrument validity.20 The m2 test is asymptotically distributed as a standard 
normal under the null of no second-order serial correlation, and provides a further check on 
the specification of the model and on the legitimacy of variables dated t-2 as instruments. As 
stated in Beck et al. (2000), the appropriateness of the instrumental variables “gives credence 
to the conclusion that the estimated […] link between finance and growth is not due to 
simultaneity bias or insufficient control for other determinants of growth.” (p. 35).  
 
5. Regression results 
 
5.1 Main results 
Table 2 reports the system-GMM estimates of Equation (2) where ∆Yi,t is the real per capita 
GDP growth rate21. The results show a statistically and economically significant relationship 
between our financial indicators and economic growth. Specifically, our Family 1 indicators 
all attract a negative coefficient, suggesting that financial depth is negatively associated with 
growth. To assess the economic magnitude of this association, let us consider, for instance, a 
province exogenously moving from the 25th percentile of the distribution of the ratio of bank 
loans to GDP (58.1 percent) to the 75th percentile (96.8 percent). Using the coefficient in 
column 2 of Table 2, this province would experience a 0.92 percentage points slower GDP 
growth rate, which is an economically significant number. These findings contrast with the 
typical conclusion of most cross-country studies that analyzed the finance-growth nexus, 
finding a positive link between financial depth and growth. They can be a consequence of 
policies, which have promoted inefficient allocation of savings. These policies can be 
explained by the fact that the state’s main objective is not to maximize efficiency. In 
particular, it might channel capital to poor, slow-growing regions, with the aim of reducing 
poverty (Boyreau-Debray, 2003; Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). 
Our Family 2 indicators are also negatively associated with growth, probably due to 
the inefficient allocation of savings by the state-banking sector, as well as to the fact that 
state-owned banks mainly support the relatively inefficient state-owned sector. As argued by 
Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005), the state typically channels capital (through state-owned 
banks) to the inefficient SOEs, in order to avoid the unemployment consequences that would 
                                                 
20 It should be noted that when panels with a short cross-sectional dimension are used, the Sargan test has low 
power (Baltagi et al., 2007). 
21 All our results were robust to using the within-groups estimator. We only report the system-GMM estimates 
for brevity. The estimates obtained using the within-groups estimator can be found in Guariglia and Poncet 
(2006). 
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follow from SOE bankruptcy. Focusing on the ratio of state-owned banks’ credit to GDP and 
using the coefficient in column 6 of Table 2, a province exogenously moving from the 25th 
percentile of the distribution of state-owned banks’ credit to GDP (45.8 percent) to the 75th 
percentile (78.3 percent) would experience a 1.66 percentage points slower GDP growth rate, 
which is once again economically significant22.  
Finally, our Family 3 indicators generally display positive coefficients, suggesting that 
a higher use of more market and profit-oriented financial transactions (such as loans relative 
to state budget appropriation, and self-raised funds) promotes growth. For instance, based on 
the coefficient reported in column 9 of Table 2, a province exogenously moving from the 25th 
percentile of the distribution of the share of fixed investment financed by self-raised funds 
(41.1 percent) to the 75th percentile (52.8 percent) would benefit from a 1.03 percentage point 
faster GDP growth rate. 
The variables in the conditioning information set also have the expected signs. Lagged 
GDP per capita attracts a negative (although not always significant) coefficient, indicating a 
process of convergence. Our proxy for human capital accumulation generally attracts a 
positive and significant coefficient. Finally, among our policy indicators, the share of state 
entities in total investment enters as a negative determinant of economic growth, while our 
proxies for the degree of openness (trade and FDI share of GDP) have a positive impact on 
economic growth.  
The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions indicates that the orthogonality 
conditions cannot be rejected at the five percent level, and the m2 test for the second order 
autocorrelation of the first-differenced residuals suggests that the error term is not serially 
correlated. Thus, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are appropriate. The 
strong link between finance and growth does not appear to be driven by simultaneity bias.  
Table 3 presents the system-GMM estimates relative to physical capital accumulation, 
and Table 4, those relative to TFP growth23. Table 3 shows that like in the case of real GDP 
growth, all our Family 1 and Family 2 indicators are negatively associated with physical 
                                                 
22 (1- SOCB CREDIT share) is the share of non state-owned commercial banks in total credit, and can be seen as 
a proxy for the money lent to the private sector. Using this variable as a financial indicator shows that the share 
of non-state-owned commercial banks in total credit exerts a positive effect on economic growth and its sources. 
This suggests that the higher the share of total credit that is provided by non-state banks, the more credit flows 
towards the more efficient private firms, allowing them to grow faster, and raising provincial GDP and 
productivity growth. Moreover, it is likely that compared to state-owned banks, non-state owned banks are more 
engaged in researching firms before making the actual loans, and in exerting corporate control once the loan has 
been made, leading to a higher efficiency in the process, and consequently, to higher GDP and productivity 
growth. These results are not reported for brevity, but are available from the authors upon request. 
23 Since the province of Chongqing was only created in 1997, it was not possible to compute its capital stock. As 
such, only 29 provinces are used in the capital stock and TFP growth equations. 
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capital accumulation. Thus, contrary to Beck et al. (2000), financial intermediary 
development indicators do have a significant impact on capital accumulation. This can be 
seen as evidence that the inefficient allocation of saving hampers capital accumulation, 
probably because the private firms, which have more potential to invest, are unable to obtain 
funds. Coming to our Family 3 indicators, we can see that only the share of total investment 
in fixed assets financed by self-raised funds has a positive and significant effect on capital 
accumulation.  
We obtain similar results for productivity growth (Table 4): in this case, however, the 
coefficients associated with our Family 3 indicators are all positive and statistically 
significant. These results point to the fact that the positive impact of market and profit-
oriented financial transactions on economic growth mainly operates through enhanced 
efficiency, while the negative impact of other financial indicators seems to work both through 
lower returns and capital constraints. 
 
5.2 Can reverse causality be ruled out? 
Although the use of a system-GMM estimator ensures that the relationship found between 
finance and growth is essentially explained by the effects of the exogenous component of our 
financial indicators on growth, it does not completely rule out that growth can also influence 
financial development. To further investigate the issue of reverse causality of the relationship 
between finance and economic growth, we have performed a panel Granger causality test 
(Holtz-Eakin et al., 1989), for whether growth causes subsequent financial development. 
Specifically, we have estimated an Equation of the following type: 
 
FINANCEi,t = aoFINANCEi,t-1+ a1FINANCEi,t-2+ b1 GDP GROWTHi,t-1 +  
+ b2 GDP GROWTHi, t-2+ ei+ et + vi,t,     (10) 
 
where FINANCEi,t represents in turn one of our eight financial indicators; ei  denotes province 
fixed-effects; et, time-fixed effects; and vi,t, an idiosyncratic error term. In this framework, the 
variable GDP GROWTH is said not to Granger cause the variable FINANCE if all the 
coefficients on lagged GDP GROWTH in Equation (10) are not significantly different from 0, 
i.e. if b1 = b2 = 0. The results of the estimates of Equation (10), together with the p-values 
associated with the F-test aimed at testing our null hypothesis are presented in Table A1 in 
Appendix 2. We can see that for each of our eight financial indicators, the null hypothesis 
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cannot be rejected. There is therefore no evidence that GDP GROWTH Granger causes 
financial development24.  
An alternative way to test for whether GDP GROWTH Granger causes FINANCE is to 
estimate both the restricted (assuming that b1 = b2 = 0) and unrestricted models using the same 
moment conditions, and compare their Sargan statistics using an incremental Sargan/J test of 
the form: DRU = n(J1 – J2), where J1 denotes the J statistic for the restricted model; J2, the J 
statistic for the unrestricted model; and n, the number of observations (Bond et al., 2001; 
Bond and Windmeijer, 2005). Under the null hypothesis that GDP GROWTH does not 
Granger cause FINANCE, DRU is asymptotically distributed as a χ2 with r degrees of freedom, 
where r is the number of restrictions (2 in our case). Table A1, in Appendix 2 reports the DRU 
statistics for our eight financial indicators: in all cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that GDP GROWTH does not Granger cause FINANCE 25.  
Our results so far indicate that financial distortions do represent an impediment to 
economic growth26. But what can then explain the phenomenal growth characterizing the 
Chinese economy? We attempt to answer this question by looking first at whether the 
negative relationship between finance and growth has become weaker over time, as a 
consequence of the banking sector reforms, and then by trying to determine whether there are 
circumstances under which financial distortions might not be an impediment to economic 
growth after all. 
 
6. Evolution over time and FDI dependence of the finance-growth relationship 
 
6.1 Evolution over time 
As we discussed in Section 2.1, since the beginning of the economic reform, China has 
experienced a fundamental change with regard to the means of allocating financial resources. 
Major banking reforms were initiated in 1994, and a further impulse for changes in the 
banking sector came about with China’s entry in the WTO in 2001. Consequently, as shown in 
Table 1a, state interventionism has significantly declined in the latest years of our sample. 
However, although these changes in banking policy are important, serious banking sector 
                                                 
24 These results were robust to adding other control variables to the regressions. 
25 Similar results, not reported for brevity, but available from the authors upon request, hold for per capita capital 
accumulation, and per capita TFP growth. 
26 Our results were generally robust to adding further regressors measuring the quality of institutions, such as the 
share of private firms in output or employment, and an indicator measuring the number of opened economic 
zones, i.e. the zones allowed to operate in an economic environment without regulations against the 
marketization and internationalization of economic activities (Démurger et al., 2002). 
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problems remain. It is therefore of primary interest to investigate whether the relationship 
between finance and economic growth has evolved over the period of reform. We would 
expect that the rationalization and introduction of market driven practices in the final years of 
our sample would mitigate the problem of misallocation of funds, and therefore reduce the 
estimated negative impact of our indicators of financial development and state interference on 
growth. We also anticipate that reforms will reduce the differences between the various 
sources of financing in terms of returns to investment. In a context of widespread efficiency, 
there is in fact no reason to expect higher effects on growth of investment financed by loans, 
state appropriation, or self-raised funds. Returns to investment financed with different sources 
should converge and equalize in parallel with financial system reforms, so that our indicators 
of market driven finance would lose their relevance over time. In order to test this hypothesis, 
we estimate the following variant of Equation (2):  
 
εληβ γβα tititittititi CONTROLLATEFINANCEFINANCEY ,,,2,1, * ++++++=∆   (11) 
 
where LATEt represents a dummy equal to 1 in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, and 0 
otherwise27. If the estimated negative impact of our indicators of financial development and 
state interference on growth is indeed reduced in the later years of our sample, and the 
positive impact of our indicators of market driven finance is mitigated, then we should 
observe a positive and significant β2 coefficient for our Family 1 and 2 indicators, and a 
negative and significant β2 coefficient for Family 3 indicators (together with a negative β1 
coefficient for Family 1 and 2 indicators, and a positive β1 coefficient for Family 3 
indicators). 
 The estimates of Equation (11) for GDP growth, capital accumulation, and TFP 
growth are respectively presented in columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 528. Columns 1 and 3 show 
that the coefficients associated with Family 1 financial indicators are negative and precisely 
determined, while the interactions between the indicators and the LATE dummy are generally 
positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the negative effect of most Family 1 
financial indicators on GDP and TFP growth became weaker over the final years of our 
sample (2000-2003), possibly due to the financial system reforms, which reduced the 
                                                 
27 Our results were generally robust to setting the dummy LATEt equal to one in 2001 to 2003; or in 1999 to 
2003. 
28 To save space, Table 5 only shows the coefficients on our financial indicators and the interaction terms. Full 
estimates can be found in Guariglia and Poncet (2006). 
 22
system’s inefficiencies. In a number of cases, summing the coefficients on the financial depth 
indicators and that on the same indicators interacted with the dummy gives a positive number: 
this shows that financial depth became positively associated with GDP and TFP growth after 
2000. For instance, focusing on column 1 of Table 5, and summing the coefficients on BANK 
CREDIT, and its interaction with the LATE dummy, yields 0.008, which can be interpreted as 
the coefficient on BANK CREDIT in the latest years of the sample (2000-2003). This number 
suggests that if a province were to exogenously move from the 25th percentile of the 2000-
2003 distribution of BANK CREDIT (66 percent) to the 75th percentile (103 percent), it would 
experience a 0.36 percentage point faster GDP growth rate. 
Column 2 of Table 5 reports the regressions for capital accumulation: the relationship 
between our Family 1 financial indicators and capital accumulation did not significantly 
change over time. This can be explained by the fact that a more efficient financial system led 
to a rationalization of investment behavior, and not to an increase in capital accumulation. 
Rawski (2006) documents China’s traditional reliance on “extensive” growth achieved by 
adding more resources to the production process, rather than “intensive” growth based on 
higher productivity. Officially managed investments typically generate low returns, and the 
overall investment picture in China reveals a surprising persistence of Soviet-style outcomes. 
Vigorous reform efforts are expected to increase investment returns and address the problems 
of ineffectual decision-making (Von Pfeil, 2004). As such, financial system reforms should 
help mitigating the Soviet-style seasonality pattern in investment spending and reduce 
excessive investment.  
The negative effects of most of our Family 2 indicators on GDP, TFP, and capital 
stock growth appears to generally have declined or been reversed over time, although not all 
indicators are associated with a positive and significant β2 coefficient. 
Coming to our Family 3 indicators, all columns of Table 5 show that their positive 
effect on GDP and TFP growth, and physical capital accumulation, declined over time (the 
interaction terms attract negative and precisely determined coefficients), and in some cases 
became insignificantly different from zero. This can be explained by the fact that as the 
banking system became more efficient, it started to positively affect growth and its sources, 
reducing the difference in terms of effects on growth of the alternative forms of financing 
such as self-raised funds.  
Financial distortions have therefore declined over time, hindering growth to a lower 
extent. Yet, China’s growth has been phenomenal not only after 2000, but also before that, 
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when financial distortions were still severe. So what can explain the co-existence between this 
sustained growth and strong financial distortions? 
 
6.2 Does the finance-growth relation depend on FDI presence in each province? 
We now investigate whether the sensitivity of economic performance to financial 
intermediation depends on the FDI to GDP ratio in each province. This analysis is motivated 
by Harrison et al. (2004), according to whom firms in countries with greater FDI inflows 
suffer less from financial constraints and have therefore more growth opportunities, as 
incoming foreign investment provides additional sources of capital. Specifically, in the 
Chinese case, private enterprises may look for foreign investors, being constrained in their 
activity due to distortions in the state-dominated financial system (Huang, 2003; Luo, 2007)29. 
As we discussed in Section 2.1, most of the SOCBs’ credit goes in fact to SOEs, and banks 
typically impose stricter scrutiny criteria and collateral requirements on private firms 
compared to other firms (financial bias). The problem was exacerbated prior to 2004 when 
China’s Constitution did not commit to the protection of property rights of private firms (legal 
bias). Establishing joint-ventures with foreign firms may allow private firms to bypass both 
the financial bias (by using foreign firms as sources of finance) and the legal bias (by 
accessing the superior legal protection and regulatory treatment granted to foreign firms)30. 
On average, over the period under investigation, FDI accounted for 8.7 percent of the total 
investment in fixed assets at the provincial level (China Statistical Yearbook, various issues). 
The share peaked at 13.9 percent in 1994. It is thus very likely that FDI is a significant source 
of financing for Chinese firms. 
Our aim is to determine whether in the presence of FDI, financial distortions may 
become less of an impediment to economic growth. We conduct a straightforward test of this 
hypothesis, introducing interaction terms of our indicators of financial intermediation, with 
                                                 
29 Havrylchyk and Poncet (2007) provide primary empirical confirmation of this thesis. They find that indicators 
of the distorting nature of the inefficient banking sector are important determinants of the FDI received by 
Chinese provinces. It should be noted, however, that while this thesis might explain part of the inward FDI in 
China, it cannot explain the very rapid increase that took place more recently, when discrimination against 
private firms was becoming less relevant. See Prasad and Wei (2005) for a discussion of other possible factors 
explaining the behavior of FDI in China in recent years. 
30 Prior to 1999, private firms were also banned from exporting directly, while foreign-invested firms were 
granted automatic trading licenses within their lines of business. Establishing joint-ventures with foreign firms 
made it therefore easier for private firms to enter export markets. 
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the logarithm of the stock of FDI to GDP in each province and year (FDI stocki,t/GDPi,t)31. 
We therefore estimate the following Equation: 
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A positive β2 coefficient for Family 1 and 2 financial indicators, and a negative β2 
coefficient for Family 3 indicators (together with a negative β1 coefficient for Family 1 and 2 
indicators, and a positive β1 coefficient for Family 3 indicators) would suggest that the higher 
the FDI in each region, the lower the constraints related to the misallocation of finance, and 
the less the heterogeneity in terms of returns to investment depending on financing sources32.  
The estimates of Equation (12) for GDP growth, capital accumulation, and TFP 
growth are respectively presented in columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 633. The results suggest that 
provinces characterized by higher FDI stocks relative to GDP tend to suffer less from the 
negative effects of Family 2 indicators on GDP, capital, and TFP growth. For instance, the 
results in column 1 show that if a province with an FDI stock to GDP ratio of 10.05 percent 
(the sample mean less one third the sample standard deviation) were to exogenously move 
from the 25th percentile of the distribution of the SOCB CREDIT share (55 percent) to the 75th 
percentile (74 percent), it would experience a 0.99 percentage point slower per capita GDP 
growth rate. For a province with an FDI stock to GDP ratio twice as large, the same increase 
in SOCB CREDIT would result in a 0.45 percentage point slower GDP growth rate. These 
findings support the view that FDI may be used as a way to bypass the inefficiencies of the 
local banking sector. In particular, private firms, for whom it is difficult to obtain loans from 
state banks, may use foreign joint-ventures to acquire needed capital, and can in this way 
achieve higher productivity and growth rates (Harrison et al., 2004; Huang, 2003; Luo, 
2007)34.  
                                                 
31 We use the stock of FDI to GDP ratio as an interaction term, instead of the ratio of FDI inflows to GDP, since 
the former indicator is likely to better capture the overall presence of foreign firms in each province. Our results 
were generally robust to using the ratio of FDI inflows to GDP as an interaction term. 
32 Using a similar methodology, Rioja and Valev (2004) study whether the relationship between finance and 
growth varies across countries characterized by different levels of financial development. 
33 Once again, to save space, Table 6 only shows the coefficients on our financial indicators and the interaction 
terms. Full estimates can be found in Guariglia and Poncet (2006). 
34 Inspection of data from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey (2003), which includes 2400 firms 
surveyed in 13 cities in 2003, suggests that 12 percent of private firms (i.e. of those firms with a private share 
greater than 49 percent) have shares owned by a foreign partner. Moreover, the sales per employee of these firms 
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Similar results are observed for the effects of our Family 1 indicators on TFP growth, 
but not for GDP and capital growth35. Coming to our Family 3 indicators, we find that the 
positive effects of loans over state budget appropriation on GDP and TFP growth are lower in 
high FDI recipient provinces.  
In sum, our results indicate that provinces with higher FDI stocks relative to GDP 
benefit from faster economic growth primarily thanks to enhanced efficiency, and seem to be 
less sensitive to the negative impact of state intervention induced inefficiency and constraints 
in capital access36. FDI can therefore help to alleviate the costs associated with financial 
distortions, and could provide an explanation for why, as discussed by Allen at al. (2005), 
China is a counterexample to the findings of the finance-growth literature, being characterized 
by malfunctioning financial institutions and phenomenal growth rates37.  
 
7. Conclusions 
We have used data for 30 Chinese provinces over the period 1989-2003 to study the 
relationship between finance and economic growth. Moving beyond existing literature, we 
have considered a wide range of financial indicators, accounting both for the size and the 
quality of financial intermediation; focused on two important sources of GDP growth: 
physical capital accumulation, and total factor productivity growth; and investigated whether 
the relationship between our financial indicators and growth has changed over time, and 
whether it differs across provinces characterized by different FDI stock to GDP ratios.  
                                                                                                                                                        
are 15 times higher, and their growth over the period 2001-2002 was almost 5 times faster than those of the 100 
percent domestically owned private firms. This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that those private 
firms that enter joint-ventures with foreign firms are able to bypass the costs associated with an inefficient 
banking sector in China, and can consequently achieve higher productivity and growth rates. 
35 In column 2 of Table 6, which reports the estimates for capital accumulation, we can see that while the Family 
1 indicators do not attract statistically significant coefficients, their interactions with the FDI stock to GDP ratio 
attract negative and precisely determined coefficients. This finding can be explained by the fact that FDI-
financed projects may be driven more by a logic of efficiency than by a logic of spending. Consequently, FDI 
abundant environments may promote less disbursement-driven investment, reducing the rhythm of capital 
accumulation. 
36 One could claim that instead of being driven by FDI being a major source of financing, our results may be 
driven by it being an indicator of more market based or reformed provinces. In order to assess whether this is the 
case, we replaced the FDI stock variable with the share of state units in investment (STATE ENTITIES) as an 
interaction term for our financial development indicators. The results, which are not reported for brevity, show 
that these new interaction terms are generally insignificant, suggesting that our results based on the FDI 
interactions do not stem from the fact that FDI is an indicator of more reformed provinces. 
37 Alfaro et al. (2004), Durham (2004), and Hermes and Lensink (2003) use cross-country data to look at the 
other side of the coin: they examine the extent to which the effects of FDI on growth depend on the countries’ 
level of financial development. They find that it is only countries with well-developed financial markets that gain 
significantly from FDI. They argue that the lack of development of local financial markets can limit the 
economy’s ability to take advantage of potential FDI spillovers. In contrast, we show that, in the Chinese 
context, it is financial distortions at home that may lead domestic firms to establish joint-ventures with foreign 
firms. 
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We found that traditionally used indicators of financial development and China-
specific indicators measuring the level of state interventionism in finance are generally 
negatively associated with growth and its sources, while indicators measuring the degree of 
market driven financing in the economy tend to promote GDP and TFP growth, as well as 
capital accumulation. This suggests that financial distortions do represent an impediment to 
growth.  
In order to explain how, in spite of the distortions, China managed to sustain 
phenomenal growth rates, we showed that the adverse effects of financial distortions on 
growth have gradually declined over time, probably due to the progressive restructuring of the 
banking sector in China. We also showed that these effects tend to be weaker for high FDI 
recipients, suggesting that FDI may be used to alleviate the costs associated with the 
inefficient banking sector: private firms, which are generally discriminated against by the 
local financial system, might be able to use foreign joint-ventures as sources of finance, and 
might consequently achieve higher productivity and growth rates. FDI could therefore 
provide an explanation for why, as discussed by Allen at al. (2005), China is a counter-
example to the findings of the finance-growth literature, being characterized by 
malfunctioning financial institutions and phenomenal growth rates. It is obviously also 
possible that growth has been so high in China despite the poorly performing banking sector, 
because private firms were able to make use of alternative mechanisms such as internal 
finance, non-bank financial intermediaries, and coalitions of various forms among firms; 
investors, and local governments. Yet, whichever the explanation for the Chinese growth 
miracle, we can conclude that there are indeed circumstances under which financial 
distortions do not represent an impediment to growth in China after all. 
More insights on the link between financial development and growth in China can be 
derived from a comprehensive firm-level study of the determinants of firms’ growth, with 
particular emphasis on whether this growth is constrained by the quantity of internal finance 
and the types of external finance available to firms. This is on the agenda for future research. 
 
Appendix 1: Definition of the variables and statistical sources  
Most data on the banking and financial sector for Chinese provinces are taken from the annual 
issues of the “Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking” (ACFB). Data on growth and its 
components as well as data on our control variables are taken from annual issues of the China 
Statistical Yearbook (CSY) and from two statistical books that provide data at the provincial 
level from 1978 onwards (“China Regional Economy, a Profile of 17 Years of Reform and 
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Opening Up” issued by the China Statistical Bureau, CRE, and “1949-1999 China Statistical 
Data Compilation” issued by the China Marketing Research, CMR). This Appendix provides 
the exact definition (and the source, in parentheses) for each indicator used as explained or 
explanatory variables in our regressions. All our variables are measured at the province level. 
 
Explained variables 
GDP per capita and GDP GROWTH: logarithm of real GDP per capita and annual growth 
(deflation based on annual CPI) (source: CSY). 
CAPITAL GROWTH: annual growth of real per capita capital stock (deflation based on annual 
CPI). The capital stock is computed based on the perpetual inventory method with a 
depreciation rate of five percent. The initial capital stock is computed following Harberger’s 
(1978) assumption of a steady-state capital-output ratio in 1974. Investment flows are real 
investments in fixed assets (source: CSY). 
TFP GROWTH: annual growth of per capita TFP, computed following Equation (1) in the 
text.  
 
Explanatory variables 
Financial indicators: 
Family 1: Size of financial sector 
BANK CREDIT: ratio of total bank loans to GDP (source: ACFB) 
TOTAL CREDIT: ratio of total loans (in bank and non-bank financial institutions) to GDP 
(source: ACFB) 
SAVINGS: ratio of households’ savings deposits in financial intermediaries relative to GDP 
(source: CMR and CSY). 
 
Family 2: State-related misallocation of funds 
SOCB CREDIT share: share of state-owned commercial banks in total credit (source: ACFB).  
SOCB CREDIT to GDP: ratio of state-owned commercial banks’ credit to GDP (source: 
ACFB). 
CENTRAL: ratio of loans to deposits of the state-owned banks (source: ACFB). 
 
Family 3: Profit-driven allocation of funds 
LOANSoverAPPRO: share of fixed asset investment financed by domestic loans relative to 
that financed by state budgetary appropriation (source: CSY and CMR). 
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SELF-RAISED FUNDS: share of fixed asset investment financed by self-raised funds (source: 
CSY and CMR). 
 
 Control variables: 
EDUCATION: Share of population with more than primary schooling (source: CSY) 
CPI: Inflation rate based on the CPI (source: CSY) 
STATE ENTITIES: Share of state entities in total investment in fixed assets (source: CSY) 
GOV: Government expenditure over GDP (source: CRE) 
OPENNESS ratio: ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (source: CSY) 
FDI/GDP: ratio of foreign direct investment inflows to GDP (source: CSY and authors’ 
computation). FDI inflows are defined as the investments inside China by foreign enterprises 
and economic organizations or individuals (including overseas Chinese, compatriots from 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and Chinese enterprises registered abroad), following the 
relevant policies and laws of China for the establishment of ventures exclusively with foreign 
own investment, Sino-foreign joint-ventures, and cooperative enterprises, or for co-operative 
exploration of resources with enterprises or economic organizations in China. It includes the 
re-investment by foreign entrepreneurs of profits gained from investment, as well as the funds 
that enterprises borrow from abroad in the total investment of projects, which are approved by 
the relevant department of the government. 
 
Other 
FDI stock/GDP: ratio of foreign direct investment stock to GDP (source: CSY and authors’ 
computation). The FDI stock is computed as the sum of the deflated FDI inflows, where the 
U.S. Department of Labor Producer Price Index for Capital Equipment is used as a deflator. 
 
List of provinces and municipalities 
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Nei Monggol, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Hainan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Sichuan, 
Chongqing. 
 
Appendix 2: Investigating the reverse causality issue: a Granger causality test 
Table A1 presents the estimates of Equation (10), which is aimed at assessing whether GDP 
GROWTH Granger causes FINANCE. 
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Table 1a: Descriptive statistics 
 Entire sample 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
Early 
Period:  
1989-1999 
 
(2) 
 
Late 
Period: 
2000-2003 
 
(3) 
Low 
FDI 
stock/GDP 
 
(4) 
 
High 
FDI  
stock/GDP 
 
(5) 
Dependent variables 
 
GDP GROWTH 
 
 
0.09 
(0.05) 
 
 
 
0.09 
(0.05) 
 
 
0.09 
(0.03) 
 
 
0.09 
(0.05) 
 
 
0.10 
(0.05) 
CAPITAL GROWTH 
 
0.13 
(0.05) 
0.13 
(0.05) 
0.13 
(0.04) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
0.14 
(0.06) 
TFP GROWTH 0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Controls  
 
Lagged real GDP per capita (yuan) 
 
 
3 442 
(2 804) 
 
 
2 754 
(1 991) 
 
 
5 289 
(3 702) 
 
 
2 430 
(1 184) 
 
 
6 354 
(3 883) 
CPI: inflation rate 6.94 
(8.17) 
9.28 
(8.36) 
0.52 
(1.47) 
7.73 
(8.20) 
4.78 
(7.75) 
EDUCATION 
 
0.76 
(0.11) 
0.73 
(0.10) 
0.86 
(0.09) 
0.73 
(0.10) 
0.85 
(0.10) 
STATE ENTITIES: share in investment 0.62 
(0.16) 
0.65 
(0.15) 
0.52 
(0.14) 
0.64 
(0.14) 
0.55 
(0.18) 
FDI / GDP 0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
OPENNESS ratio 0.23 
(0.29) 
0.20 
(0.23) 
0.29 
(0.40) 
0.12 
(0.10) 
0.52 
(0.43) 
GOVernment expenditures over GDP 0.13 
(0.05) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
0.16 
(0.06) 
0.13 
(0.05) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
Financial indicators 
 
Family 1: BANK CREDIT 
 
 
0.81 
(0.32) 
 
 
0.78 
(0.26) 
 
 
0.91 
(0.44) 
 
 
0.77 
(0.25) 
 
 
0.93 
(0.46) 
 TOTAL CREDIT 0.99 
(0.43) 
0.95 
(0.37) 
1.09 
(0.54) 
0.90 
(0.28) 
1.21 
(0.63) 
 SAVINGS 0.55 
(0.28) 
 
0.48 
(0.24) 
0.73 
(0.31) 
0.48 
(0.18) 
0.75 
(0.41) 
Family 2: SOCB CREDIT share 0.65 
(0.13) 
0.68 
(0.13) 
0.59 
(0.08) 
0.68 
(0.13) 
0.58 
(0.10) 
 SOCB CREDIT to GDP 0.65 
(0.23) 
0.64 
(0.23) 
0.65 
(0.25) 
0.63 
(0.20) 
0.68 
(0.30) 
 CENTRAL 
 
1.02 
(0.32) 
1.12 
(0.32) 
0.77 
(0.10) 
1.10 
(0.32) 
0.82 
(0.20) 
Family 3: LOANSoverAPPRO  5.02 
(3.66) 
5.34 
(3.50) 
4.27 
(3.92) 
4.50 
(3.18) 
6.56 
(4.46) 
 SELF-RAISED FUNDS 0.48 
(0.09) 
0.48 
(0.09) 
0.45 
(0.08) 
0.48 
(0.09) 
0.45 
(0.06) 
Observations  450 330 120 328 114 
 
Notes: The Table reports the variables’ means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Column (4) refers to those province-year 
observations characterized by a ratio of FDI stock to GDP that falls in the bottom three quartiles of the distribution. Column (5) refers to 
those observations that fall in the top quartile. See Appendix 1 for precise definitions of all variables. 
Table 1b: Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
GDP 
GROWTH
 
CAPITAL
GROWTH
 
TFP 
GROWTH BANK 
CREDIT
TOTAL 
CREDIT SAVINGS 
 
SOCB 
CREDIT 
share 
SOCB 
CREDIT to 
GDP CENTRAL
LOANSover 
APPRO 
 
SELF-
RAISED 
FUNDS 
GDP GROWTH  1.00           
CAPITAL GROWTH  0.60 1.00          
TFP GROWTH 0.93 0.28 1.00         
BANK CREDIT -0.12 -0.14 -0.08 1.00        
TOTAL CREDIT -0.09 -0.12 -0.04 0.93 1.00       
SAVINGS -0.04 -0.09 -0.11 0.70 0.83 1.00      
SOCB CREDIT share -0.20 -0.13 -0.23 -0.08 -0.22 -0.39 1.00     
SOCB CREDIT to GDP  -0.19 -0.16 -0.10 0.87 0.84 -0.57 0.30 1.00    
CENTRAL  -0.15 -0.20 -0.13 -0.10 -0.20 -0.46 0.61 0.14 1.00   
LOANSoverAPPRO  0.32 0.18 0.40 -0.03 0.09 0.12 -0.34 -0.12 -0.07 1.00  
SELF-RAISED FUNDS 0.14 0.06 0.11 -0.41 -0.35 -0.23 0.03 -0.37 0.14 0.14 1.00 
 
Notes: See Appendix 1 for precise definitions of all variables. 
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Table 2: Finance and GDP growth 
Dependent variable: GDP GROWTH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Lagged real GDP per capita -0.019 -0.021 -0.022 -0.029** -0.019 -0.031** -0.041** -0.023 -0.004 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) 
EDUCATION 0.038 0.057 0.066* 0.084** 0.042 0.085* 0.026 0.077** 0.024 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.037) (0.034) (0.033) (0.046) (0.038) (0.037) (0.034) 
STATE ENTITIES: share in investment -0.035** -0.034** -0.029* -0.037** -0.034*** -0.016 -0.023 -0.030** -0.028* 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.022) (0.012) (0.014) 
FDI/GDP 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.006 0.009** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
OPENNESS ratio 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.007 -0.001 0.010 0.010 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) 
GOVernment expenditure over GDP -0.004 0.015 0.009 0.011 -0.003 0.020* -0.019 0.001 0.005 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.009) (0.013) 
CPI: inflation rate 0.246* 0.001 0.038 0.055 0.201 0.108 0.248* 0.167 0.089 
 (0.124) (0.139) (0.141) (0.135) (0.123) (0.138) (0.124) (0.164) (0.206) 
BANK CREDIT  -0.018*        
  (0.010)        
TOTAL CREDIT   -0.019*       
   (0.011)       
SAVINGS    -0.026**      
    (0.011)      
SOCB CREDIT share     -0.036*     
     (0.021)     
SOCB CREDIT to GDP      -0.031***    
      (0.011)    
CENTRAL       -0.048**   
       (0.020)   
LOANSoverAPPRO        0.002**  
        (0.001)  
SELF-RAISED FUNDS          0.041** 
         (0.018) 
Constant -0.849 0.348 0.180 0.086 -0.661 -0.141 -0.715 -0.463 -0.216 
Fixed effects by year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 434 407 377 431 376 398 398 399 399 
Sargan 
(degrees of freedom) 
13.33 
(177) 
9.62 
(182) 
12.01 
(182) 
12.06 
(182) 
14.18 
(177) 
9.44 
(160) 
13.40 
(81) 
5.88 
(182) 
14.68 
(136) 
m2 1.20 1.12 0.96 1.18 0.58 0.78 0.91 0.87 1.14 
 
Note: All regressions were estimated using a system-GMM estimator. All variables are expressed in logarithms. The sample 
used in estimation consists of 30 provinces between 1989 and 2003. All right hand-side variables were instrumented using 
two or more lags of themselves in the first-differenced equation, and their first-difference lagged once in the levels equation. 
Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. m2 is a test for second- 
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Sargan statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. See 
Appendix 1 for precise definitions of all variables. 
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Table 3: Finance and capital stock growth 
Dependent variable:   
CAPITAL GROWTH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Lagged real GDP per capita -0.011 -0.008 -0.006 -0.016 -0.021 -0.014 -0.028 -0.011 -0.000 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019) 
EDUCATION 0.005 0.033 0.042 0.045 0.015 0.037 0.017 -0.023 0.030 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.038) (0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.054) (0.043) (0.045) 
STATE ENTITIES: share in investment -0.067*** -0.052*** -0.046** -0.062** -0.064*** -0.049** -0.067*** -0.048*** -0.045** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.018) (0.024) (0.014) (0.020) 
FDI/GDP 0.016** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.014** 0.014** 0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
OPENNESS ratio -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) 
GOVernment expenditure over GDP 0.025* 0.049*** 0.039** 0.034** 0.028** 0.060*** 0.008 0.016 0.029** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.021) (0.020) (0.012) (0.013) 
CPI: inflation rate 0.567*** 0.396** 0.416** 0.495** 0.668*** 0.483*** 0.640*** 0.468* 0.483 
 (0.175) (0.167) (0.154) (0.218) (0.168) (0.169) (0.149) (0.260) (0.322) 
BANK CREDIT  -0.030**        
  (0.013)        
TOTAL CREDIT   -0.024**       
   (0.010)       
SAVINGS    -0.026**      
    (0.011)      
SOCB CREDIT share     -0.062*     
     (0.033)     
SOCB CREDIT to GDP      -0.043**    
      (0.017)    
CENTRAL       -0.074**   
       (0.033)   
LOANSoverAPPRO        0.000  
        (0.001)  
SELF-RAISED FUNDS         0.031** 
         (0.015) 
Constant -2.340*** -1.570** -1.720** -2.022** -2.846*** -1.958** -2.593*** -1.903* -2.057 
 (0.739) (0.732) (0.685) (0.947) (0.744) (0.754) (0.653) (1.061) (1.420) 
Fixed effects by year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 427 400 370 424 369 391 391 392 392 
Sargan 
(degrees of freedom) 
8.42 
(177) 
10.26 
(182) 
5.88 
(165) 
8.23 
(160) 
10.78 
(134) 
9.64 
(160) 
6.43 
(81) 
4.66 
(186) 
6.42 
(138) 
m2 0.63 0.50 0.46 0.59 0.52 0.37 0.63 0.54 0.25 
 
Note: All regressions were estimated using a system-GMM estimator. All variables are expressed in logarithms. The sample 
used in estimation consists of 29 provinces between 1989 and 2003. Also see Note to Table 2. *, **, *** indicate significance 
at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. See Appendix 1 for precise definitions of all variables. 
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Table 4: Finance and TFP growth  
Dependent variable: TFP GROWTH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Lagged real GDP per capita 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.016 0.005 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
EDUCATION 0.029 0.009 0.024 0.048 0.007 0.035 0.016 0.047 0.010 
 (0.030) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.041) (0.042) (0.047) (0.036) (0.042) 
STATE ENTITIES: share in investment -0.001 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.012 0.020 0.019 0.000 -0.018 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.009) (0.017) 
FDI/GDP -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
OPENNESS ratio 0.007 0.011* 0.012* 0.012** 0.012* 0.016** 0.016** 0.005 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
GOVernment expenditure over GDP -0.017** -0.009 -0.006 -0.010 -0.023* -0.002 -0.021 -0.016* -0.015 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
CPI: inflation rate -0.101 -0.107 -0.178 -0.194 -0.070 -0.133 0.036 -0.081 -0.137 
 (0.098) (0.108) (0.109) (0.128) (0.098) (0.119) (0.129) (0.126) (0.141) 
BANK CREDIT  -0.019*        
  (0.010)        
TOTAL CREDIT   -0.024*       
   (0.012)       
SAVINGS    -0.023**      
    (0.011)      
SOCB CREDIT share     -0.028*     
     (0.016)     
SOCB CREDIT to GDP      -0.026*    
      (0.014)    
CENTRAL       -0.026*   
       (0.015)   
LOANSoverAPPRO        0.002***  
        (0.000)  
SELF-RAISED FUNDS          0.042** 
         (0.017) 
Constant 0.442 0.450 0.798 0.926* 0.318 0.689 0.002 0.331 0.613 
 (0.407) (0.462) (0.474) (0.549) (0.408) (0.519) (0.562) (0.540) (0.658) 
Fixed effects by year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 427 400 370 424 369 391 391 392 392 
Sargan 
(degrees of freedom) 
6.65 
(177) 
9.42 
(154) 
2.80 
(154) 
9.75 
(164) 
6.09 
(119) 
10.96 
(120) 
15.08 
(67) 
12.07 
(181) 
3.66 
(125) 
m2 0.76 0.42 0.98 0.63 0.33 0.75 0.52 0.41 0.72 
 
Note: All regressions were estimated using a system-GMM estimator. All variables are expressed in logarithms. The sample 
used in estimation consists of 29 provinces between 1989 and 2003. Also see Note to Table 2. *, **, *** indicate significance 
at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. See Appendix 1 for precise definitions of all variables. 
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Table 5: Finance and growth: evolution over time 
 
   
GDP  
GROWTH 
 
(1) 
 
 
CAPITAL  
GROWTH 
 
(2) 
 
 
TFP 
GROWTH 
 
(3) 
 
 
BANK CREDIT  
 
-0.031** 
 
-0.032** 
 
-0.020* 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) 
BANK CREDIT * LATE 0.039** 0.012 0.036*** 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.009) 
TOTAL CREDIT -0.028** -0.037** -0.031*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) 
TOTAL CREDIT * LATE 0.033* -0.007 0.043*** 
 (0.019) (0.029) (0.011) 
SAVINGS  -0.026*** -0.022 -0.025** 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) 
SAVINGS * LATE 0.023 -0.021 0.033*** 
 (0.020) 
 
(0.023) (0.011) 
 
SOCB CREDIT share  
 
-0.048* 
 
-0.082** 
 
-0.036* 
 (0.024) (0.032) (0.019) 
SOCB CREDIT share * LATE 0.055** 0.159*** 0.012 
 (0.024) (0.047) (0.026) 
SOCB CREDIT to GDP  -0.041*** -0.049*** -0.022* 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) 
SOCB CREDIT to GDP * LATE 0.038** 0.026 0.036*** 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.009) 
CENTRAL -0.044** -0.073** 0.004 
 (0.022) (0.034) (0.012) 
CENTRAL* LATE 0.031 0.125* -0.012 
 (0.052) 
 
(0.070) (0.020) 
 
LOANSoverAPPRO 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.002** 
 
0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LOANSoverAPPRO * LATE -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SELF-RAISED FUNDS 0.065*** 0.028* 0.072*** 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.025) 
SELF-RAISED FUNDS*LATE -0.069*** -0.066* -0.083* 
 (0.024) (0.035) (0.042) 
Control variables yes yes yes 
Fixed effects by year yes yes yes 
 
Note: All regressions were estimated using a system-GMM estimator. Control variables include lagged real GDP per capita, 
EDUCATION, STATE ENTITIES: share in investment, FDI/GDP, OPENNESS ratio, GOVernment expenditure over GDP, 
and CPI: inflation rate. All variables are expressed in logarithms. The sample used in estimation consists of 30 provinces 
between 1989 and 2003 in column (1), and 29 provinces over the same period in columns (2) and (3). Also see Note to Table 
2. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. See Appendix 1 for precise 
definitions of all variables. 
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Table 6: Finance and growth: the role of FDI 
 
  
GDP 
GROWTH 
 
(1) 
 
 
CAPITAL 
GROWTH 
 
(2) 
 
 
TFP  
GROWTH 
 
(3) 
 
 
BANK CREDIT  
 
-0.042** 
 
0.018 
 
-0.044*** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.014) 
BANK CREDIT * (FDI stock/GDP) 0.008 -0.013* 0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) 
TOTAL CREDIT -0.013 0.044 -0.049** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.018) 
TOTAL CREDIT *(FDI stock/GDP) 0.001 -0.016** 0.013*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) 
SAVINGS  -0.014 0.041 -0.036*** 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.011) 
SAVINGS *(FDI stock/GDP) -0.003 -0.019*** 0.007*** 
 (0.004) 
 
(0.006) (0.002) 
 
SOCB CREDIT share  
 
-0.093*** 
 
-0.095** 
 
-0.062*** 
 (0.031) (0.041) (0.021) 
SOCB CREDIT share * (FDI stock/GDP) 0.026*** 0.020** 0.018*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) 
SOCB CREDIT to GDP  -0.058*** -0.017 -0.062*** 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.013) 
SOCB CREDIT to GDP * (FDI stock/GDP) 0.012*** -0.008 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
CENTRAL -0.070*** -0.098*** -0.028* 
 (0.023) (0.032) (0.015) 
CENTRAL* (FDI stock/GDP) 0.019** 0.019** 0.014** 
 (0.007) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
 
LOANSoverAPPRO 
 
0.004*** 
 
-0.000 
 
0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
LOANSoverAPPRO *( FDI stock/GDP) -0.001** 0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
SELF-RAISED FUNDS 0.014 0.022 0.025* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
SELF-RAISED FUNDS*( FDI stock/GDP) 0.007 0.001 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Control variables yes yes yes 
Fixed effects by year yes yes yes 
 
Note: All regressions were estimated using a system-GMM estimator. Control variables include lagged real GDP per capita, 
EDUCATION, STATE ENTITIES: share in investment, FDI/GDP, OPENNESS ratio, GOVernment expenditure over GDP, 
and CPI: inflation rate. All variables are expressed in logarithms. The sample used in estimation consists of 30 provinces 
between 1989 and 2003 in column (1), and 29 provinces over the same period in columns (2) and (3). Also see Note to Table 
2. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. See Appendix 1 for precise 
definitions of all variables. 
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Table A1: Investigation of reverse causation in the finance-growth relationship: a Granger causality test 
 
 
Dependent variable: FINANCE 
indicator  
 
 
TOTAL 
CREDIT 
 
(1) 
 
BANK CREDIT
 
(2) 
 
SAVINGS 
 
(3) 
 
SOB CREDIT share 
 
(4) 
 
SOB CREDIT to GDP 
 
(5) 
 
CENTRAL
 
(6) 
 
LOANS over APPRO 
 
(7) 
 
SELF-RAISED FUNDS 
 
(8) 
 
GDP GROWTH lagged once 0.166 -0.013 -0.056 0.438 -0.154 -0.127 0.855 -0.310 
 (0.274) (0.194) (0.178) (0.260) (0.300) (0.199) (1.201) (0.294) 
GDP GROWTH lagged twice 0.287 0.184 -0.011 0.104 0.072 0.011 -1.099 -0.036 
 (0.570) (0.418) (0.119) (0.118) (0.239) (0.134) (1.497) (0.500) 
FINANCE indicator lagged once 1.474*** 1.541*** 1.263*** 0.892*** 1.470*** 0.978*** 0.876*** 0.896*** 
 (0.153) (0.110) (0.094) (0.083) (0.083) (0.118) (0.069) (0.117) 
FINANCE indicator lagged twice -0.452*** -0.571*** -0.270* 0.201* -0.406*** -0.133** 0.077 0.110 
 (0.146) (0.131) (0.141) (0.098) (0.121) (0.060) (0.075) (0.112) 
Constant -0.110 -0.052 0.019 -0.038 0.040 -0.031 0.403* 0.077 
 (0.107) (0.067) (0.042) (0.057) (0.052) (0.032) (0.235) (0.146) 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 322 354 378 322 343 343 346 346 
Sargan 17.88 15.49 17.16 13.52 21.36 16.28 14.58 11.53 
(degree of freedom) (33) (33) (33) (33) (31) (30) (33) (33) 
m2 -0.69 -0.86 -1.89 -1.18 -2.47 1.61 0.01 -0.18 
Granger Causality F(2,29) 0.21 0.18 0.05 1.95 0.33 0.25 1.66 0.60 
Granger Causality p-value 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.15 0.72 0.78 0.21 0.55 
DRU 962.94 539.95 185.22 1224.72 780.88 523.97 674.7 861.54 
 
Note: All regressions were estimated using a system-GMM estimator, in which all right hand-side variables were instrumented using two or more lags of themselves in the first-differenced 
equation, and their first-difference lagged once in the levels equation. The Granger causality test examines the null hypothesis that each financial indicator is not Granger-caused by economic 
growth. The first test that we use is an F-test aimed at testing the hypothesis that the coefficients on the lags of GDP GROWTH are jointly equal to 0. Our second test is an incremental Sargan 
test of the form: DRU = n(J1 – J2), where J1 denotes the J statistic for the restricted model; J2, the J statistic for the unrestricted model; and n, the number of observations. Under the null 
hypothesis that GDP GROWTH does not Granger cause FINANCE, DRU is asymptotically distributed as a χ2 with r degrees of freedom, where r is the number of restrictions (2 in our case). Also 
see Note to Table 2. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. See Appendix 1 for precise definitions of all variables.  
